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Abstract:
This paper examines a “falsification test” from the recent minimum wage literature. The
analysis illustrates several pitfalls associated with developing and interpreting such ex-
ercises, which are increasingly common in applied empirical work. Clemens and Wither
(2014) present evidence that minimum wage increases contributed to the magnitude
of employment declines among low-skilled groups during the Great Recession. Zip-
perer (2016) presents regressions that he interprets as falsification tests for Clemens and
Wither’s baseline regression. He interprets his results as evidence that Clemens and
Wither’s estimates are biased. In this paper, I demonstrate that Zipperer’s falsification
tests are uninformative for their intended purpose. The properties of clustered robust
standard errors do not carry over from Clemens and Wither’s baseline specification (27
treatment states drawn from 50) to Zipperer’s falsification tests (3 or 5 “placebo treat-
ment” states drawn from 23). Confidence intervals calculated using a setting-appropriate
permutation test extend well beyond the tests’ point estimates. Further, I show that the
sub-samples to which Zipperer’s procedure assigns “placebo treatment status” were dis-
proportionately affected by severe housing crises. His test’s point estimates are highly
sensitive to the exclusion of the most extreme housing crisis experiences from the sam-
ple. An inspection of data on the housing market, prime aged employment, overall
unemployment rates, and aggregate income per capita reveals the test’s premise that
regional neighbors form reasonable counterfactuals to be incorrect in this setting.
∗Clemens: University of California at San Diego, Jeffrey Clemens, Economics Department, 9500 Gilman
Drive #0508, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, USA. Telephone: 1-509-570-2690. E-mail: clemens.jeffrey@gmail.com.
Significant portions of text draw heavily on the text of Clemens and Wither (2014), which this paper
supplements. I thank David Neumark for comments. I am grateful to the Don and Sybil Harrington
Foundation and the economics department at the University of Texas at Austin for their generous financial
support and hospitality during the writing of this paper.
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Falsification tests are an increasingly common element of applied empirical work. In
simple Google Scholar searches, for example, the search terms “falsification test” and
“economics” appear jointly in only 28 entries from 1990 to 1999. In 2016 alone, the
phrases appear together in 886 entries, up from 687 in 2015 and 183 in 2010.1
The intent of falsification exercises is to provide a test that is informative regarding
the validity of an underlying estimate and/or estimation strategy. In practice, however, it
can be difficult to evaluate whether such tests have been implemented on a systematic or
ad hoc basis, whether appropriate inference procedures have been applied, and whether
the test’s point estimates are prone to bias. I use a falsification test from the recent
minimum wage literature to illustrate these issues.
During the Great Recession and subsequent recovery, employment declined dramat-
ically among individuals with low levels of experience and education. The analyses in
Clemens and Wither (2014) and Clemens (2015) explore the extent to which the fed-
eral minimum wage, which rose from $5.15 to $7.25 over this time period, contributed to
these declines. These analyses make use of the fact that the $7.25 federal minimum wage
was differentially binding across states. Using standard difference-in-differences, triple-
difference, and matching estimators, Clemens and Wither (2014) and Clemens (2015)
estimate that this period’s minimum wage increases explain a non-trivial fraction of the
decline in low-skilled groups’ employment.2
In a recent working paper, Zipperer (2016) critiques selected portions of a September
2016 revision of Clemens and Wither (2014).3 Zipperer summarizes his findings by
1These searches were conducted on March 19, 2017. The total numbers of entries containing the phrase
“economics” were lower in 2016 and 2015 than in 2010, suggesting that the propensity for economics
articles to use the phrase “falsification test” has increased more dramatically than the raw counts imply.
2A September 2016 revision of Clemens and Wither (2014) consolidates these empirical analyses.
This revision can be found at the following link: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/˜j1clemens/pdfs/
ClemensWitherMinimumWageGreatRecession.pdf.
3The December 2016 version of the critique, which is modestly updated from a November 2016 version,
can be found at the following link: http://cdn.equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/
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writing: “I find that the authors’ baseline results are not robust to sectoral or geographic
controls, which reduce the magnitude of the baseline point estimates by 35.6 to 62.7
percent. Moreover, their research design fails a placebo-based falsification test.” My
focus in this paper is on the properties of Zipperer’s “placebo-based falsification test.”4
I show that this exercise falls far short of what Zipperer claims it delivers. I highlight
several distinct issues that, in addition to being relevant to this particular setting, may be
of interest to researchers tasked with evaluating or developing falsification tests in other
settings.
A first set of issues involves statistical inference. Falsification exercises may have
different inference properties than the baseline they are being used to evaluate. In the
present case, this is relevant for two reasons. First, the falsification test is conducted on
a subset of the baseline analysis sample. Second, the test’s sample is less evenly divided
into “treatment” and “control” units than the baseline analysis sample. Further, because
the exercise’s development comes with many degrees of freedom, multiple hypothesis
testing concerns should be kept in mind.
I demonstrate that Zipperer’s falsification tests are uninformative for their intended
purpose. Zipperer implicitly assumes that the properties of clustered robust standard er-
rors carry over from Clemens and Wither’s baseline specification to his falsification test.
Simulations from Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller (2008) suggest that this assumption is unlikely to hold. Clemens and Wither’s
baseline specification involves a sample in which there are 27 treatment states drawn
from 50 total states. By contrast, Zipperer’s falsification tests assign placebo treatment
status within a sample consisting of Clemens and Wither’s 23 control states. One test
assigns placebo treatment status to 3 of these 23 states; the other assigns placebo treat-
2016/12/02155549/120616-WP-comments-on-clemens-and-wither.pdf.
4I save a fuller analysis of Zipperer’s preferred specification for Clemens (2017), which connects several
applied econometric issues into a longer running debate within the minimum wage literature.
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ment status to 5 of these 23 states. I show that confidence intervals constructed using a
setting-appropriate permutation test (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2012; Imbens
and Rosenbaum, 2005) are, on average, more than twice as wide as the confidence inter-
vals Zipperer reports. They extend well beyond both the point estimate from Clemens
and Wither’s baseline and the point estimates from the falsification exercises. In con-
trast, the confidence interval associated with Clemens and Wither’s baseline changes
little when calculated using permutation test methods rather than clustered robust stan-
dard errors.
This initial point, namely that Zipperer’s test is uninformative, is important to bear
in mind throughout. My subsequent empirical analysis reveals that the point estimates
from Zipperer’s falsification tests are quite sensitive. The observed sensitivity (e.g., point
estimates changing sign and increasing in magnitude) would be surprising if the stan-
dard errors he reports were correct. It is far less surprising in light of the confidence
intervals I estimate using the permutation test approach.
A second set of issues involve sources of bias. My general point is that falsification
tests are sufficiently distinctive exercises that their development and evaluation requires
attention to test-specific sources of bias. A first issue is that threats to identification
can be shaped by the algorithm a falsification test uses in its assignment of “placebo
treatment status” across sampled units.5 As detailed below, this has high relevance in the
current setting. A second issue is that the appropriate null hypothesis for a falsification
5A separate issue applies in settings where falsification tests involve assessing whether a treatment is
correlated with changes in an outcome that it should not affect. In this case, it is important to consider
what sources of bias might affect the new outcome under analysis. In analyses of the health benefits of
health insurance, for example, deaths from “internal causes” are sometimes the outcome of interest while
deaths from “external causes,” which include accidental deaths, are are potentially used as a falsification
test. In this case, the baseline analysis of disease-related deaths could safely ignore correlations between
the policy change of interest and policy changes involving traffic safety and gun laws. Traffic safety and
gun laws may be quite relevant, however, to the validity of the falsification test. Changes in such laws
may have effects on accidental deaths that, if not taken into account, could bias the falsification test in one
direction or another.
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test may not be 0. In many settings, including the current setting, the appropriate null
may involve a muted effect or an effect of opposite sign.6
I show that the states to which Zipperer’s procedure assigns “placebo treatment sta-
tus” were disproportionately affected by severe housing crises. A majority of the indi-
viduals in the placebo treatment sample in Zipperer’s “region-based” exercise reside in
Florida. Similarly, a majority of the placebo treatment sample in his “division-based”
exercise reside in either Florida or Arizona. Readers familiar with the geography of the
housing crisis will recognize this distribution of the placebo treatment sample across
states to be a likely source of bias. I show that the point estimates from Zipperer’s tests
are highly sensitive to these states’ inclusion in the sample.
The premise underlying Zipperer’s exercise is that regional neighbors provide rea-
sonable counterfactuals for one another.7 The plausibility of this premise is readily in-
vestigated by examining the evolution of macroeconomic covariates across the states that
are proposed as one another’s counterfactuals. An inspection of state level data on the
housing market, prime aged employment, overall unemployment rates, and aggregate
income per capita reveals the test’s premise to be incorrect.
Finally, I investigate whether the specifications Zipperer advances as being preferred
to the Clemens and Wither baseline satisfy his own falsification test. They do not. The
falsification test would, if taken at face value, support the conclusion that Zipperer’s pre-
ferred specifications are biased towards finding positive effects of this period’s minimum
wage increases on employment.
I conclude by emphasizing that Zipperer’s falsification test should be taken as evi-
6As Zipperer reports in his table 3, placebo treatment is modestly positively correlated with actual
minimum wage increases. The appropriate null hypothesis for his falsification test is thus not 0 if viewed
as a test for whether Clemens and Wither’s baseline estimate is unbiased.
7The exercise is thus relevant to the broader minimum wage literature because this is also the premise
underlying Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer’s (2017) critique of work by Neumark and Wascher
(2006), Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014b), and Meer and West (2016).
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dence against neither his preferred specification nor the baseline estimate from Clemens
and Wither. As discussed above, the test is uninformative for its intended purpose. Fur-
ther, the biases to which the test is exposed are quite clear from the data presented in
section 3. The test’s sensitivity, as explored in section 5, likely reflects both of these
issues.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides background on
the research setting. Section 2 describes the falsification test Zipperer advances. Section 3
presents macroeconomic data that are informative for assessing the premise underlying
the falsification test. Section 4 presents my evaluation of the falsification test’s inference
properties. Section 5 presents my analysis of the test’s sensitivity to its inclusion of
states with extreme housing crisis experiences. Section 5 also explores how Zipperer’s
preferred specification performs under his own falsification test. Section 6 concludes.
1 Background Regarding the Research Setting
1.1 Variation Generated by the Increase in the Federal Minimum Wage
This section provides an abbreviated description of the minimum wage changes ana-
lyzed in Clemens and Wither (2014). Legislation passed in May 2007 caused the federal
minimum wage to rise from $5.15 to $7.25 in 3 increments of 70 cents. The increments
were implemented in July 2007, July 2008, and July 2009. The analysis makes use of
the fact that, to a first approximation, states were either fully bound by the final 70 cent
increment or unbound by that increment. This motivates a division of the states into a
treatment group of “bound” states and a control group of “unbound” states. The divi-
sion of states and the evolution of effective minimum wage rates can be found in figures
1 and 2 respectively, both of which appear in Clemens and Wither (2014).
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1.2 Estimation Strategies
Clemens and Wither (2014) use wage data from the 2008 panel of the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation (SIPP) to identify the least skilled workers within these
treatment and control groups.8 The most basic estimation framework in the original
analysis is a difference-in-differences framework. The analysis compares the employ-
ment and income trajectories of low-skilled individuals in bound states to low-skilled
individuals in unbound states. That is, it follows the trajectories of individuals who
were employed at low wage rates during the 2008 SIPP panel’s first year, which corre-
sponds with the 12 months preceding the federal minimum wage’s July 2009 rise from
$6.55 to $7.25.9
The difference-in-differences analysis takes the following form:
Yi,s,t = ∑
p(t) 6=0
βp(t)Bounds × Periodp(t) + α1sStates
+ α2tTimet + α3iIndividuali + Xs,tγ+ εi,s,t. (1)
Equation (1) includes controls for state, States, time, Timet, and individual-specific,
Individuali, fixed effects. The vector Xs,t contains time varying controls for each state’s
macroeconomic conditions.
Graphical evidence presented in Clemens and Wither (2014) motivates the dynamics
for which the specification allows. The analysis characterizes May to July 2009 as a
8The primary analysis sample consists of individuals whose average wage rates between August 2008
and July 2009 were less than $7.50. In response to both Zipperer and an anonymous referee, Clemens
and Wither (2014) have considered the robustness of their estimates to alternative sample construction
procedures. A first alternative approach analyzed samples selected based on the distance between an
individual’s baseline wage rates and his or her state’s minimum wage. A second alternative approach
analyzed samples selected based on individuals’ percentiles within bound and unbound states’ wage
distributions. These results are presented elsewhere.
9Clemens (2016) uses the same estimation framework to analyze a variety of program participation
and budget related outcomes.
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“Transition” period, prior months as the baseline, August 2009 through July 2010 as
period “Post 1,” and all subsequent months as period “Post 2.”
In this setting, the most obvious threat to econometric identification is the possibility
that the forces underlying the Great Recession were either more or less severe in the
“bound” group than in the “unbound” group. To gauge the relevant biases, Clemens
and Wither (2014) report a set of macroeconomic time series that include two labor
market aggregates, overall economic output, and a proxy for housing market conditions.
I reproduce and further discuss these macroeconomic time series in section 3. The key
fact is that all four macroeconomic covariates reveal the underlying recession to have
been more severe in the states that comprise the control group than in the states that
comprise the treatment group.
The first portion of Zipperer’s analysis involves augmenting equation (1) with inter-
actions between time effects and variables that describe states’ industry shares in 2005
and 2006:
Yi,s,t = ∑
p(t) 6=0
βp(t)Bounds × Periodp(t) + α1sStates
+ α2tTimet + α3iIndividuali + Xs,tγ
+ α3tInd. Share
05-06
s × Timet + εi,s,t. (2)
At the conclusion of this paper’s analysis, I apply Zipperer’s falsification tests to his
specification in which Ind. Share05-06s represents a vector of industry shares across a
set of 10 NAICS supersectors. This specification underlies two of Zipperer’s graphical
presentations, as well as some of his strongest quantitative claims.10 A more dedicated
10For reasons that will become apparent below, the falsification test cannot be applied to Zipperer’s
specifications that contain time varying geographic fixed effects. This is because these control sets are are
perfectly collinear with the variation in “placebo treatment” status.
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assessment of the relative merits of specifications (2) and (1) can be found in Clemens
(2017).
2 Understanding the “Falsification Test”
This section lays out the exercise Zipperer presents as a falsification test for Clemens
and Wither’s baseline specification. To the extent possible, I quote from Zipperer’s
working paper to describe its mechanics. After describing the exercise, I provide more
detailed commentary regarding its intent, the premise underlying its validity, and the
information that is relevant for assessing that premise.
The sample analyzed in Zipperer’s falsification test is a subset of the low-wage sam-
ple analyzed in Clemens and Wither’s baseline specification. Specifically, it consists of
the subset of these individuals who reside in the control group, meaning the 23 states
that were not fully bound by this period’s federal minimum wage changes. Within
that set of states, Zipperer assigns placebo treatment status to unbound states in pre-
dominantly bound-state regions. As Zipperer describes the procedure, “I focus on the
unbound states, which by construction do not receive treatment, and assign them a
placebo increase in the minimum wage if they reside in a Census division or region
where a majority of the population lives in actually bound states.”
On a sample restricted to the 23 unbound states, Zipperer then estimates
Yi,s,t = ∑
p(t) 6=0
βp(t)Placebo Boundr(s) × Periodp(t) + α1sStates
+ α2tTimet + α3iIndividuali + Xs,tγ+ εi,s,t, (3)
where r(s) indexes regions. Zipperer goes on to observe that “The South is the only
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region-bound region.” This refers to the fact that, for the region-based test, placebo
treatment status is assigned to “unbound” states in the south. The test’s control group
thus consists of unbound states in census regions other than the south. Zipperer also
conducts a version of the test that uses census divisions rather than regions. He writes
that “In this case, the South Atlantic and Mountain regions are the division-bound areas
containing unbound states.”
Zipperer’s interpretation of his tests’ results is that “a negative estimate for [βp(t)
from equation (3)] suggests that CW’s main specification conflates minimum wage ef-
fects with omitted regional shocks.” Negative estimates are precisely what Zipperer
finds, as shown in table 1, which reproduces Zipperer’s (2016) table 3. My replication
appears in subsequent tables.
An appreciation of the logic underlying Zipperer’s interpretation of his falsification
test may require a clearer statement of the exercise’s key assumption. The key assump-
tion is that minimum wage changes are as good as randomly assigned within the regions
and divisions Zipperer designates as “region bound” and “division bound.” Put differ-
ently, the key assumption is that the bound and unbound states within these regions
experienced economic shocks of similar magnitude. If true, Zipperer would be correct
to interpret a non-zero estimate of βp(t) as reflecting differences in economic conditions
that would also bias the estimates from Clemens and Wither’s baseline.
Interestingly, a more broadly applied version of this assumption is at the heart of
the debate over analyses of a three-decade panel of state and federal minimum wage
changes.11 The relevant question involves the issue of whether variation that extends
11Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014a) estimate negative employment effects using variations in min-
imum wage policy that extend both across and within census regions. Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zip-
perer (2017) argue that unbiased estimates can only be obtained by restricting attention to within-region
variations in minimum wage policy. This is implemented in practice by adding time-varying geographic
fixed effects to the regression specification. The analysis in Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), which criti-
cizes a larger body of work underlying Neumark and Wascher’s (2006) book, includes a placebo test that
follows the same logic as the placebo test in Zipperer (2016).
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both across and within regions is more or less prone to bias than variations that occur
exclusively within regions. As Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014a) and Neumark and
Wascher (2017) point out, a useful analogy can be made between within-region variation
in minimum wage policy and “within-family” approaches to estimating the returns to
education. The key point is that stand applied econometric considerations make clear
that “within” comparisons can plausibly generate estimates that are either more or less
biased than comparisons that extend both “across” and “within” families or regions.
3 What Potential Biases Are Implied by Macroeconomic
Indicators?
This section presents evidence on the evolution of several broad macroeconomic in-
dicators that describe cross-state variations in the severity of the forces underlying the
Great Recession. I emphasize two sets of comparisons. The first comparison involves the
full sets of “bound” and “unbound” states analyzed by Clemens and Wither’s baseline.
These comparisons are relevant for gauging the biases to which Clemens and Wither’s
estimation strategy is exposed. I next compare the states to which Zipperer assigns
placebo treatment status to their regional neighbors. These are the comparisons that
are relevant for assessing whether his “falsification tests” are informative regarding the
validity of the Clemens and Wither baseline.12
12Recall from above that Zipperer’s key assumption is that the placebo treatment states experienced
economic shocks that were similar to those experienced by their neighbors, which are among the actual
treatment states in Clemens and Wither’s analysis. The comparisons made below are thus precisely the
comparisons of interest for assessing that assumption.
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3.1 Comparing the Housing Crises in Treatment and Control States
Figure 3 presents times series for a set of macroeconomic indicators presented orig-
inally in Clemens and Wither (2014). Two of the series, the state unemployment rate
and employment to population ratio, are comprehensive employment indicators from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). A third series, taken from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), describes total state economic output. The final indicator, a median
house price index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), proxies for the
housing market component of states’ recessionary environments.
Clemens and Wither (2014) use the data in figure 3 to provide evidence that the
Great Recession was more severe in their control group than in their treatment group.
From 2006 through 2012, aggregate income declined by roughly $1,000 per capita more
in the unbound states than in the bound states. The aggregate unemployment rate
increased more than 1 percentage point more in the unbound states than in the bound
states and the employment to population ratio declined by roughly 1 percentage point
more. Finally, median house prices declined by roughly $80,000 more in the unbound
states than in the bound states. The macroeconomic indicators in figure 3 thus point
uniformly to the conclusion that the Great Recession was more severe in the states that
comprise Clemens and Wither’s (2014) control group than in the states that comprise
their treatment group. Failure to control for this difference would tend to bias estimated
employment impacts towards 0.
3.2 Examining the Severity of the Housing Crisis in the Placebo Treat-
ment States
I now focus more narrowly on the macroeconomic developments that are relevant
for assessing Zipperer’s falsification test. As explained above, the test’s key assumption
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is that minimum wage changes are as good as randomly assigned within the census
regions and divisions Zipperer designates as “region bound” and “division bound.”
That is, his interpretation requires that the states he codes as “placebo treatment” states
are appropriate counterfactuals for their regional neighbors. The assumption can be
summarized as requiring that the actual treatment states and placebo treatment states
experienced similar macroeconomic shocks.
Zipperer reports that the South is the source of placebo treatment states in his region-
based exercise and that the South Atlantic and Mountain West are the sources of placebo
treatment states in his division-based exercise. While he does not list the states to which
the “placebo treatment” designation is applied, they can be inferred by using figure
1 to identify the “unbound” states in these regions. In the South and narrower South
Atlantic, the unbound states are Florida, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.13 In
the Mountain West, they are Arizona and Colorado. In the region-based exercise, more
than 80 percent of the relevant population thus comes from Florida. In the division-
based exercise, more than 75 percent of the relevant population thus comes from Florida
or Arizona. Readers familiar with the geography of the housing crisis will recognize this
to be problematic, as Florida and Arizona experienced two of the most extreme housing
crises around the country.
Tables 2 and 3 present data on macroeconomic conditions that compare the Great
Recession’s severity in the placebo treatment states to the states for which they are being
used as counterfactuals. Table 2 reports data underlying Zipperer’s region-based com-
parisons while Table 3 reports data underlying Zipperer’s division-based comparisons.
I present changes over two time periods of interest. In both tables, Panel A presents
changes for which the base period precedes both the crisis and the federal minimum
13In principle this group also includes Delaware. In practice, however, the low-wage SIPP simple
contains no Delaware residents.
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wage legislation under analysis. Panel B presents changes for which the base period
is the base period associated with the SIPP regression analysis, namely August 2008
through April 2009.14 In both panels, changes are calculated from the relevant base
period through the “post” period from the regression analysis, namely August 2009
through the end of 2012.
The data speak with near uniformity. The Great Recession was significantly more se-
vere in the states to which Zipperer assigns placebo treatment status than in the states for
which they are being used as counterfactuals. The comparison between the placebo treat-
ment states and other states in the South is particularly striking. Consider the changes
described in panel A. On average, the placebo treatment individuals were in states in
which median house prices declined by $156,000, prime age employment declined by
6.5 percentage points, the overall unemployment rate rose by 6 percentage points, and
personal income per capita declined by $3,800. In the remainder of the South, by con-
trast, median house prices declined by $14,000, prime age employment declined by 3.8
percentage points, the overall unemployment rate rose by 3.7 percentage points, and
personal income per capita declined by $500. The difference in the severity of the Great
Recession was thus quite significant. Differences over the shorter time horizon examined
in panel B are more moderate but still substantial. Table 3 reveals that the differences
relevant to the division-based exercises are also quite substantial.
Comparisons between the placebo treatment states and their regional neighbors are
central to the falsification test’s validity. The test’s presumption is that the regional neigh-
bors of the placebo treatment states experienced comparable economic shocks. Tables 2
and 3 reveal this presumption to be incorrect.
Tables 2 and 3 also present data on the macroeconomic experiences of the placebo
14Recall that, motivated by dynamics observed in both the wage and employment data, the regression
codes May 2009 through July 2009 as a “Transition” period.
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control states. Differences between the experiences of the placebo treatment and placebo
control states can be found in column 5. The differences are, once again, quite substan-
tial. This reveals that estimates from the falsification test are likely to be biased in the
direction of finding a negative relationship between placebo treatment status and the
employment of low-skilled individuals.
4 Inference within the Falsification Test
This section presents evidence on the confidence intervals associated with Zipperer’s
falsification test. Zipperer implicitly assumes that the properties of clustered robust stan-
dard errors carry over from Clemens and Wither’s baseline specification to his falsifica-
tion exercise. Simulations from Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) suggest that this assumption is unlikely to hold. Clemens and
Wither’s baseline specification involves a sample in which there are 27 treatment states
drawn from 50 total states. By contrast, Zipperer’s falsification tests assign placebo treat-
ment status within a sample consisting of Clemens and Wither’s 23 control states. The
region-based test assigns placebo treatment status to 3 states, while the division-based
test assigns placebo treatment status to 5 states.
I estimate confidence intervals for both of Zipperer’s falsification tests, as well as for
the Clemens and Wither baseline, using both clustered robust standard errors and per-
mutation test methods (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2012; Imbens and Rosen-
baum, 2005). The permutation test procedure involves estimating a distribution of
“placebo treatment effects,” the dispersion of which provides evidence on the statisti-
cal uncertainty underlying the point estimates of interest. The 95 percent confidence
interval implied by the permutation test is simply the range of placebo treatment esti-
mates such that 2.5 percent of the estimates fall both above and below the interval.
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The exercise preserves the underlying estimator’s structure with respect to the num-
ber of units from which treatment status is drawn and the number of units to which
treatment status is applied. For Zipperer’s region-based exercise, for example, each it-
eration of the procedure assigns placebo treatment status to 3 of the 23 states on which
the estimator was implemented. For the division-based exercise, each iteration assigns
placebo treatment status to 5 of the 23 states on which the estimator was implemented.
For the Clemens and Wither baseline, each iteration assigns placebo treatment status to
27 of the 50 states on which the original estimator was implemented. In each case, the
distribution of placebo treatment effects is the result of 500 iterations of the procedure.
Figures 4 and 5 present the resulting distributions. Table 4 describes the resulting
confidence intervals and compares them with the confidence intervals associated with
clustered robust standard error estimation. For the falsification tests, the confidence
intervals calculated using the permutation test approach are, on average, more than
twice as wide as the confidence intervals Zipperer reports. They extend well beyond
both the point estimate from Clemens and Wither’s baseline and the point estimates
from the falsification exercises. This reveals the falsification tests to be uninformative for
their intended purpose. In contrast, the confidence interval associated with Clemens and
Wither’s baseline changes little when calculated using permutation test methods rather
than clustered robust standard errors.
An additional inference- and interpretation-related issue is that the significance tests
Zipperer conducts are not for the appropriate hypothesis test. As reported in Zipperer’s
table 3, “placebo treatment” status is modestly positively associated with actual mini-
mum wage changes. That is, rather than being a “placebo” test it is a test involving a
“treatment” just over 1/6th the size of the baseline treatment.15 Clemens and Wither’s
15Zipperer’s Table A.1 reveals that the treatment increases to nearly 1/3 the size of the baseline treat-
ment when he uses the full-sample time horizon rather than ending the sample in December 2011.
15
(2014) baseline estimate would, given the placebo treatment’s correlation with minimum
wage changes, imply an employment estimate of -0.012. This, rather than 0, is the ap-
propriate null if Zipperer’s test is to be interpreted as a test for whether Clemens and
Wither’s baseline estimate is unbiased.
5 The Sensitivity of the Falsification Test
Tables 5 and 6 present evidence on the sensitivity of Zipperer’s falsification tests. The
tables differ modestly with respect to the samples analyzed. Modest data processing dif-
ferences led to a slight difference between Clemens and Wither’s original analysis and
Zipperer’s near replication. These difference translate into differences in the samples on
which the falsification test is estimated. The samples underlying the estimates in table
5 correspond with Zipperer’s data processing procedure, while the samples underlying
the estimates in table 6 correspond with Clemens and Wither’s original analysis sam-
ple.16 In both tables, the estimates in panel A apply sample weights while the estimates
in panel B do not.
I explore the tests’ sensitivity to taking steps to reduce the biases associated with
the comparisons on which they rely. It should be borne in mind that, as shown in the
previous section, all of the falsification test estimates are statistically uninformative for
their intended purpose. The estimates in tables 5 and 6 are meant primarily to illustrate
that the test’s point estimates exhibit the sensitivity the permutation test implies.
My most basic approach to demonstrating the falsification tests’ sensitivity is to esti-
mate the tests on samples that exclude states that experienced relatively extreme housing
16Note that although I have perfectly replicated Zipperer’s near replication of the Clemens and Wither
baseline, there is a very slight difference between the falsification test he reports and my replication of his
test using his data processing choices. The sample differs by 4 observations and the point estimates differ
very modestly. Note that an initial indication of the test’s sensitivity is that the data processing differences
between the Clemens and Wither baseline and Zipperer’s near replication have much larger effects on
point estimates from the falsification test than on point estimates from the baseline specification.
16
crises. My first approach is to simply exclude Florida and Arizona from the sample. A
comparison of column 2 to column 1 and of column 6 to column 5 reveals that the fal-
sification test is rather wildly sensitive to these states’ inclusion. For the region-based
exercise, “post-1” point estimates shift from being moderately large and negative to be-
ing even larger and positive. Medium-run estimates become positive in most cases and
are statistically indistinguishable from 0 (even using clustered robust standard errors) in
all cases. For the division-based exercise, the “post-2” estimate moves moderately while
“post-1” estimates change from being moderately large and negative to being moder-
ately large and positive.
Columns 3 and 7 reveal that similar results are obtained when sample inclusion is
based on a more systematic matching procedure. Specifically, I restrict the sample to the
states that satisfy a matching criterion developed and implemented for a September 2016
revision of Clemens and Wither’s original analysis. The procedure involves matching
“bound” and “unbound” states on the basis of the severity of their median house price
declines, then dropping from the sample all treatment and control states for which a
match within $20,000 could not be found.17
Finally, the estimates in columns 4 and 8 show that the test is somewhat sensitive
to increasing the flexibility of the controls for variations in states’ macroeconomic con-
ditions. Specifically, I include controls for the housing price index, unemployment rate,
overall employment rate, and personal income per capita, each interacted with time pe-
riod fixed effects. This specification uniformly shifts the falsification tests’ “post 2” point
estimates towards 0. The estimates from the region-based exercise shift quite close to 0.
The estimates from the division-based exercise shift more modestly towards 0.
In a final exercise, I consider the performance of Zipperer’s preferred specification
17The specific procedure applied was nearest neighbor matching without replacement. This approach
to sample selection is sometimes called the “caliper” approach to matching.
17
when subjected to his own falsification test. The results of this exercise appear in table
7. Column 1 replicates the Clemens and Wither baseline and column 2 shows that I
have almost perfectly replicated Zipperer’s “industry-by-time controls” specification.18
Columns 3 and 4 show that Zipperer’s falsification test generates economically large and
positive coefficients when applied to his preferred specification. If these estimates are
interpreted in the same way Zipperer interprets his application of the falsification tests to
the Clemens and Wither’s baseline, they would be taken as evidence of substantial bias.
More specifically, they suggest that Zipperer’s preferred specification is biased against
finding evidence of negative employment effects of the minimum wage changes under
analysis.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines a falsification test from the recent minimum wage literature. The
test is presented by Zipperer (2016), who interprets its results as evidence that estimates
from Clemens and Wither (2014) are biased. My examination of Zipperer’s test considers
both its inference properties and the potential biases to which it is exposed.
Section 4 shows that the standard errors Zipperer (2016) reports provide a misleading
impression of precision. The mistaken assumption is that the falsification test’s inference
properties are the same as those of the Clemens and Wither (2014) baseline against which
it is advanced as a test. Section 4 shows that this assumption is incorrect and that the
test is uninformative for its intended purpose.
Section 3 shows that the falsification test is subject to substantial bias. Data on ag-
gregate employment, economic output, and the housing market show that the test relies
18The change in the point estimates between this specification and the Clemens and Wither baseline
is almost exactly the same as the change in the point estimates between Zipperer’s industry-by-time
specification and his near replication of the Clemens and Wither baseline.
18
on comparisons between states across which the severity of the Great Recession differed
dramatically. The test’s premise that regional neighbors form reasonable counterfactuals
is, in this setting, incorrect.
I conclude by emphasizing a more general problem with the increasingly prevalent
use of “falsification tests” in applied econometric analyses. The frequently ad hoc nature
of falsification tests renders them less informative than their statistical properties may
appear to imply. Sufficient specification searching can inevitably generate a “test” that
a) sounds ex ante reasonable, b) appears to discredit the hypothesis or specification the
researcher is attempting to discredit, and/or c) appears to support the hypothesis or
specification the researcher is attempting to advance. The development of such exercises
involves more artistic license than is widely acknowledged. This paper’s purpose is, in
part, to draw attention to the fact that “placebo” and “falsification” tests can fall far short
of the scientific authenticity implied by the associated terminology. The increasingly
pervasive use of this terminology is worth reconsidering.
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Figure 4: Placebo Distribution for Baseline Estimate:
Note: The figure presents the distribution of placebo point estimates associated with the baseline specifi-
cation from Clemens and Wither (2014). In each iteration of the procedure, placebo treatment status was
assigned to 27 of the 50 states in the sample. The baseline regression was then estimated using the placebo
treatment assignment. The distribution in the figure is the distribution of estimates that resulted from 500
iterations of this procedure.
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Note:The figure presents the distributions of placebo point estimates associated with the falsification tests
from Zipperer (2016). Panel A reports the distribution associated with Zipperer’s region-based exercise. In
each iteration of the procedure, placebo treatment status was assigned to 3 of the 23 states in the sample
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Table 7: Does Zipperer’s Preferred Specification Pass His Own Falsification Test?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline Zipperer Zipperer Falsification
Bound x Post 1 -0.039* -0.028
(0.018) (0.019)
Bound x Post 2 -0.059** -0.024
(0.021) (0.024)
Placebo Bound x Post 1 0.032 0.144*
(0.045) (0.053)
Placebo Bound x Post 2 0.068 0.148+
(0.058) (0.076)
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Baseline Zipperer Zipperer Falsification
Bound x Post 1 -0.044* -0.041*
(0.019) (0.019)
Bound x Post 2 -0.066** -0.043*
(0.020) (0.021)
Placebo Bound x Post 1 0.026 0.117+
(0.048) (0.063)
Placebo Bound x Post 2 0.059 0.126
(0.062) (0.079)
Weighted No No No No
N 147,459 147,459 57,583 57,583
Sample of States Unbound Unbound Unbound Unbound
Placebo Determination NA NA Region Division
Ind. Share x Time FE No Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: +, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels respectively.
Column 1 presents an estimate of equation (1). Column 2 presents an estimate of equation (2). Columns 3
and 4 present falsification tests of the same form as equation (3), but for which the underlying regression
is that from equation (2). The estimates thus show that applying Zipperer’s falsification test to his pre-
ferred specification yields economically large and positive values. Under Zipperer’s interpretation of the
falsification test, this implies significant bias against estimating negative employment effects associated
with the minimum wage changes under analysis. Standard errors allow for correlation clusters across
errors at the state level.
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